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Rethinking Statutory Antiwaiver 
Provisions Following the Lloyd's of 
London Litigation 
Mark J. Loewenstein* 
In the Lloyd's of London cases, the United States Courts of 
Appeals upheld certain forum-selection clauses that effectually 
deprived investors of the protections of the federal securities laws 
as if the investors had expressly waived those protections. This 
article examines statutory antiwaiver provisions in light of the 
Lloyd's cases, exploring the effect those provisions have on the 
administration of the federal securities laws, and suggests that 
the law be amended to allow contractual waiver in certain cir-
cumstances. 
Introduction 
This essay is about those statutory provisions, generally found in 
consumer protection and civil rights laws, that prohibit persons from 
contractually avoiding the law's protective provisions. Courts and 
commentators refer to such provisions as ''anti waiver'' or ''non-
waiver'' provisions. At first glance, the purpose and meaning of 
such provisions seem clear and obvious-to guaranty that the 
protective provisions of the law will not be lost to the terms of an 
over-reaching contract.1 By contrast, because some statutes ex-
pressly preclude waiver, one might reasonably assume that the 
*Mark J. Loewenstein is a Professor of Law at the University of Colorado, 
Boulder, Colorado. The author wishes to thank his colleague, Curtis Bradley, 
for his helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this essay, and 
Catherine Woods and Scott James for their research assistance. 
1 See, e.g., A.J. Temple Marble & Tile, Inc. v. Union Carbide Marble Care, 
Inc., 618 N.Y.S. 2d 155, 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994), afrd, 625 N.Y.S.2d 904 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995), aff'd as mod., 87 N.Y.2d 574 (1996) (the purpose of 
an anti waiver provision in the New York Franchise Sales Act was "to prevent 
a franchisor from contracting out of the liability imposed on the franchisor 
under the Act.''). 
48 
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absence of such a provision means that contracting parties may 
waive the protections of the statute. In practice, however, the inter-
pretation of an antiwaiver section, and the meaning of a statute 
without an antiwaiver section, are not so simple. While some excep-
tions exist, 2 numerous cases suggest that a person for whose benefit 
a statute was enacted generally cannot waive the protections of the 
statute by contract, either because the waiver violates the public 
policy as expressed in the law, 3 or because the waiver would be un-
conscionable. 4 Thus, courts generally interpret statutes without an 
antiwaiver section as though such a section were present in the stat-
ute. 
More startling, in a recent series ofcases, the federal courts held, 
2The principal exception relates to statutes that do not reflect a broad public 
interest that would be adversely affected if the statute's protections were waiv-
able. For instance, the statute of frauds may be waived by the person who 
would otherwise be able to invoke its protections. 8 Williston on Contracts 
485 (4th Ed. 1998). See also, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. 
Roberts, 461 N.E.2d 856, 857 (N.Y. 1984), where the court upheld a collec-
tive bargaining agreement that waived certain rights to meal breaks that the 
employees had under the New York Labor Law. The New York Court of Ap-
peals concluded that: 
We perceive no overriding public policy that prevents waiver or 
modification of the precise statutory terms so long as the legislative 
purpose is not undermined. 
Later in the opinion, referring to other cases in which the courts enforced 
waiver, the court noted that: 
[t]he focus in these cases, in which there was no express legislative 
indication that waiver was precluded, is upon the existence of a bona fide 
agreement by which the employee received a desired benefit in return for 
the waiver, the complete absence of duress, coercion or bad faith and the 
open and knowing nature of the waiver's execution. 
Id. at859. Compare, cases collected in note 3, infra. 
3E.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945) ("a statu-
tory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may 
not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory 
policy."); Redel's Inc. v. General Electric Co., 498 F.2d 95,99 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(prospective release of antitrust violations ''is clearly against public policy''); 
Green v. Republic Steel Corp., 338 N.E.2d. 594, 596 (N.Y. 1975) (agreement 
prospectively waiving unemployment benefits unenforceable because it would 
''conflict with the purpose of the legislation which was designed to benefit 
those in need of assistance.'') 
4E.g., Lockamy v. Byrne, 474 So.2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (waiver 
of protections of Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act unconscionable 
as a matter of law). 
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in effect, that an investor could waive the protections of the federal 
securities laws, notwithstanding the anti waiver sections of those 
laws. In the Lloyd's of London cases,S which consist of eight deci-
sions of the United States Courts of Appeals, the courts upheld the 
parties' designation of English law and English courts. By uphold-
ing this choice-of-law/forum-selection clause, the courts deprived 
the Lloyd's investors of the protections of the federal securities laws 
as though the investors had expressly waived those protections. 
These opinions were, in this author's view, plainly wrong.6 While 
the outcome of the Lloyd's cases is defensible as a matter of 
policy-the investors should have been held to their contracts-that 
outcome is indefensible as a matter of statutory interpretation. 
The presence of an antiwaiver se.ction-as illustrated by the 
Lloyd's cases-potentially has three harmful effects. First, to reach 
a just result, courts exercised legislative, not judicial, functions in 
rewriting a statute, never a happy prospect in a democracy. Second, 
the uncertain effect of the anti waiver sections in the federal securi-
ties laws complicates business dealings. Finally, the antiwaiver sec-
tions of the federal securities laws have complicated the administra-
tion of those laws, even aside from the problems posed by the 
Lloyd's cases. Each of these effects is discussed below. 
The second portion of this article examines anti waiver provisions 
in the context of the federal securities laws, and then more gener-
ally. The second portion concludes that the courts have moved away 
from a strict interpretation of antiwaiver sections, ~st by enforcing 
5Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 
1998); Roby Corp. v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir.). cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 945 (1993); Stamm v. Barclays Bank ofNew York, 153 F.3d 
30 (2d Cir. 1998); Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Haynsworth v. The Corporation, a/k/a Lloyd's of London, 121 F.3d 956 (5th 
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1513 (1998); Shell v. R.W. Sturge Ltd., 55 
F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995); Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1113 (1994); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 
135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 1998 WL 221301 (1998); Riley v. 
Kingsley Underwriting Agencies Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 
506 u.s. 1021 (1992). 
6This is also the view taken by the North American Securities Administra-
tors Association (NASAA), which filed an amicus curiae brief with the 
Supreme Court, urging the Court to grant certiorari to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit in Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 
(9th Cir. 1998). NASAA argued that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the anti-
waiver sections of the federal securities laws when it held enforceable the 
choice-of-law/forum-selection clause of the agreement in question. 
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arbitration provisions that deprived securities law claimants of a 
judicial remedy and then by enforcing choice-of-law/forum-
selection clauses that deprived those claimants of the substantive 
protections of the statutes. The third part of this essay looks at 
judicial interpretation of statutes that are silent on the question of 
waiver; that is, statutes that neither permit nor prohibit waiver. A 
review of the civil rights and antitrust law cases discussed in the 
third part suggests that statutes reflecting an important public inter-
est are construed as though they contain antiwaiver sections. As the 
federal securities laws reflect important public interests, merely 
excising the antiwaiver sections from the federal securities laws 
may not solve the problem posed by the Lloyd's cases. Part four of 
this article explores briefly the complicating effect of the antiwaiver 
sections in the administration of the federal securities laws, and 
proposes a revised provision. This article concludes that Congress 
should amend the federal securities laws to allow contractual 
waiver, at least under circumstances such as those presented in the 
Lloyd's cases. 
Statutory Antiwaiver Provisions 
The Antiwaiver Sections of the Federal Securities Laws 
Waivers in Settlements 
Each of the five statutes that comprise the federal securities laws 
contains a section, in substantially similar language, prohibiting 
waiver of its provisions.7 The antiwaiver section of the Securities 
Act is typical: 
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person 
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of 
this title or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall 
be void.8 
These antiwaiver sections generally arise in three different 
7See Securities Act of 1933, Section 14, 15 U.S.C. § 17n (1994); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Section 29, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994); Public Utilities 
Holding Companies Act of 1935, Section 26, 15 U.S.C. § 79z (1994); Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939, Section 327, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaaa (1994); Investment 
Company Act of 1940, Section 104, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (1994); Investment 
Advisors Act of 1940, Section 215, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1994). 
8 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994). 
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contexts: settlements, arbitration or choice-of-forum clauses, and 
choice-of-law clauses. The starting point for the analysis of any 
waiver issue is whether the ''condition, stipulation, or provision'' in 
question prospectively waives ''compliance'' with any provision of 
the law. 9 If so, the waiver is invalid; if not, the waiver is likely valid. 
Read literally, the antiwaiver section seems inapplicable to releases 
of past noncompliance, because the section appears to be forward-
looking. It protects a person ''acquiring any security,'' not a person 
who has acquired a security and subsequently released someone 
who failed to comply. 10 Nevertheless, the courts have applied the 
section to releases, holding, for instance, that a broad general release 
covers only those securities claims that the releasor knew of or had 
reason to know of.11 
An expansive reading of the antiwaiver section can even void a 
release of a known claim, as Pearlstein v. Scudder & German12 
demonstrates. Pearlstein involved an extension of credit by a 
registered broker/dealer to a customer in violation of Section 7(c) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and 
Regulation T of the Federal Reserve System.13 Together, these pro-
visions prohibited a registered broker/dealer from extending credit 
9Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez v. Shearson/ 
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
10See, e.g., Williams v. Stone, 923 F. Supp. 689, 692-93 (E.D. Pa. 1996), 
aff'd on other grounds, 109 F.3d 890 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 383 
(1997) ( antiwaiver section in Maryland franchise act covers only "prospec-
tive'' franchisees, so release executed by existing franchisee would not violate 
the antiwaiver section). 
11 Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 402 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 
U.S. 939 (1979): Doody v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 587 F. Supp. 829, 832 (D. 
Minn. 1984); American General Insurance Co. v. Equitable General Corp., 
493 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va. 1980); Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Summit Coffee 
Co., 858 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. App. 1993), opinion withdrawn in part, 934 S.W.2d 
705 (Tx. App. 1996). But see, Driscoll v. Schuttler, 697 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. 
Ga. 1988) (declining to follow Goodman and holding that a broad release was 
effective even as to unknown claims). While there are some cases outside of 
the securities area construing releases broadly, as in Driscoll, e.g., Watson v. 
Union Camp Corp., 861 F. Supp. 1086 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (construing Georgia 
law), the weight of authority seems to be consistent with the view expressed in 
Goodman, e.g., Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Whitlock, 581 N.E.2d 664 
(Ill. 1991) (construing Illinois law), Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 
S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1991) (construing Texas law). 
12Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970). 
13 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c) (2) promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78(a). 
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to a customer beyond seven days from the date the customer 
purchased a security. At the time of the decision, the Second Circuit 
recognized a private cause of action for violation of Section 7(c) 
and Regulation T.14 In Pearlstein, the defendant-broker/dealer 
violated these provisions when, at the plaintiff-customer's request, it 
extended the period of time for payment for two unrelated securities 
transactions beyond the prescribed seven days. When the customer 
failed to pay under the extension agreements, the broker/ dealer sued 
with respect to one transaction and threatened suit in the other. Both 
matters were settled: in one, the customer signed a stipulation of 
settlement; in the other, a confession of judgment. After the 
customer repaid the broker/dealer, the customer commenced this 
action claiming damages resulting from the broker/dealer's unlaw-
ful extension of credit. 
The broker/dealer argued that the stipulation of settlement and 
confession of judgment settled any claims that the customer might 
have under the statute. The court did not agree, instead ruling that 
each of these settlements resulted in a continuing violation of the 
statute, since each gave the customer additional time to pay. The an-
tiwaiver section then operated to void the settlements because they 
contemplated a further violation of the statute.15 In effect, then, the 
court characterized the settlement as an impermissible prospective 
waiver of the statute. While the court's characterization might be 
questioned/6 the result is troubling even if the settlements were, 
indeed, prospective waivers of Section 7( c). The case demonstrates 
the harsh operation of the anti waiver section, because it is doubtful 
that Congress intended Section 7 (c) to protect purchasers of securi-
ties.17 Even if that were the purpose, moreover, should not the 
customer, who was an attorney and a sophisticated investor, be free 
14Consistent with the trend in the Supreme Court to avoid recognizing 
implied private rights of action under federal statutes, the Second Circuit has 
since held that no private right of action exists. Bennett v. United States Trust 
Co., 770 F.2d 308, 313 (2nd Cir. 1985); Dillon v. Militano, 731 F. Supp. 634 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
15Pearlstein, 429 F.2d at 1143 (the waiver would "serve only to legalize the 
very extension of credit which the margin requirements seek to prevent and 
which suits such as this one serve to discipline.''). 
16See Judge Friendly's dissenting opinion, id. at 1149. See also, supra, note 
14. 
17Id. Judge Friendly argues, with persuasive sources, that the purpose of the 
margin rules was to control credit in the securities markets so as to limit 
speculation and assure the availability of credit in other markets. 
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to make this payment arrangement if the broker/dealer agreed? As 
Judge Friendly noted in dissent: 
[The customer] bought the bonds against defendant's advice, 
refused to sell them on its urging, remained silent when the de-
fendant was pressing for payment, and settled his liability after 
having had legal advice. Equity would leave the loss where it 
was.18 
Judge Friendly argued that Congress intended the antiwaiver sec-
tions to overcome what was then a tendency of the courts to limit 
the doctrine of illegal contracts. For Judge Friendly, however, the 
court in Pearlstein had gone too far, applying the antiwaiver section 
to a situation that did not call for its application.19 Judge Friendly's 
call for a narrower reading of the antiwaiver sections was soon 
heeded. 
The Arbitration Exception 
In Wilko v. Swan,20 a case decided in 1953, the United States 
Supreme Court established a bright line rule regarding prospective 
waivers of the Securities Act. In holding invalid a contract provi-
sion that would have required a buyer of common stock to arbitrate 
any future disputes that he had with a securities brokerage finn, the 
Court jealously guarded the judicial prerogative. The pro-arbitration 
Is I d. 
19Judge Friendly cited a 1915 Supreme Court case, D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. 
v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S.165 (1915) as an example of the sort 
of jurisprudence Congress sought to avoid with the anti waiver sections. In that 
case, the parties entered into an agreement that violated the Sherman Act, but 
the party that imposed the unlawful trade restraint was successful in persuad-
ing the Court that the contract should nonetheless be enforced against the 
plaintiff. Presumably, a more modern view of illegality would have denied the 
plaintiff the ability to rely on the illegal condition in the contract. Put differ-
ently, an antiwaiver section would void defendant's consent to an illegal 
condition as an ineffectual waiver. Under this line of reasoning, Congress 
included the antiwaiver section to achieve this result, not protect a person in 
the position of the customer in Pearlstein, who was not disadvantaged by the 
agreement that included the ''objectionable'' extension of credit. Indeed, un-
like the illegal condition in D. R. Wilder, which operated to the disadvantage 
of the party pleading illegality, the illegal condition in Pearlstein operated to 
that party's advantage. 
20Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
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policy reflected in the Federal Arbitration Act21 could not overcome 
the requirement of the Securities Act that the courts ''exercise 
judicial direction to fairly assure [the] effectiveness'' of the ''protec-
tive provisions of the Securities Act.' ' 22 
In a pair of decisions in 1987 and 1989, Shearson/American 
Express v. McMahon 23 and Rodriguez v. Shearson!American 
Express, Inc.,24 however, the Court reversed itself, upholding 
contracts that required arbitration of claims under the federal securi-
ties laws. This reversal reflected a growing judicial acceptance of 
the efficacy of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism, 25 and 
represented the first departure from the strict approach of Wilko v. 
Swan. Of equal importance, the Court signaled that the anti waiver 
section has some interpretative leeway: '' [T]he right to select the 
judicial forum and the wider choice of courts are not such essential 
features of the Securities Act that § 14 is properly construed to bar 
any waiver of these provisions. Nor are they so critical that they 
cannot be waived. . . . ''26 This flexibility provides support for the 
more aggressive rulings of the Circuit courts in the Lloyd's cases, 
discussed below. 
Widening the Exception: Honoring Foreign Choice-of-Law/Forum-
Selection Clauses 
The Lloyd's of London litigation provided the courts with a chal-
lenge to the antiwaiver provisions of the federal securities laws that 
was not present in the arbitration cases. The plaintiffs in the arbitra-
tion cases retained their substantive rights under the federal securi-
ties laws; only their choice of forum was limited. In the Lloyd's 
cases, however, the plaintiffs relinquished any claims under the 
21Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§51, et. seq. (1994). 
22346 U.S. at 437. 
23Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
24Rodriguez v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
25The Court acknowledged the difference in the way at least it perceived 
arbitration: ''To the extent that Wilko rested on a suspicion of arbitration as a 
method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to 
would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong 
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving 
disputes.'' For a briefhistory of the evolving view of arbitration in the courts, 
see Kenneth R. Davis, ''The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the Se-
curities Industry," 78 B.U. L. Rev. 255, 261-78 (1998). 
26Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481 (emphasis added). 
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federal securities laws by agreeing, at the time they made their 
investments, that any disputes would be resolved in England under 
English law. The central legal questions in the Lloyd's litigation 
were whether this agreement amounted to a waiver under the federal 
securities laws and, if so, whether the court should enforce the 
waiver. While the plaintiffs had some minor victories along the 
way,27 in the end all eight circuits ruled in favor of the defendants, 
enforcing the contractual choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses.28 
Interestingly, the courts seemed to assume, without so stating, that 
the choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses did amount to a waiver of 
the protections of the federal securities laws, so the opinions focused 
primarily on whether the ''waiver'' would be enforced. 29 
The Lloyd's plaintiffs were several hundred American "Names," 
27E.g., the plaintiffs prevailed before a panel of the ninth circuit, Richards v. 
Lloyd's of London, 107 F .2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997), but lost when the circuit 
court ruled en bane to reverse the panel. 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 1998 WL 221301 (1998). Plaintiffs also prevailed before the district 
court in Leslie v. Lloyd's of London, 1995 WL 661090 (S.D. Tex. 1995), 
which was reversed in Hansworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1513 (1998). 
28See supra note 3. 
29In deciding that the choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses were valid 
under the anti waiver sections, the courts implicitly decided that the federal se-
curities laws applied to the transactions. However, the applicability of the 
federal securities laws would be debatable even in the absence of the choice-
of-law/forum-selection clauses. As an initial matter, the defendants could 
argue that the investment in Lloyd's did not involve the sale of a security. If 
this argument proved accurate, the courts would not have jurisdiction under 
the federal securities laws. Moreover, even if the investment in Lloyd's were a 
security, there is a question of whether U.S. law would reach the sale of a se-
curity that took place abroad, as was the case here. 
Under the liberal definition of a security generally employed by U.S. courts, 
the Lloyd's investment would likely, though not certainly, be characterized as 
an ''investment contract,'' which satisfies the definition of a security. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). See, 
generally, Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Regulation 35-111 (3d Ed. 1998). 
Whether U.S. law reaches the alleged fraud, however, is a closer question. 
While the issue is not free from doubt, case law suggests that U.S. courts 
would exercise jurisdiction under the "conduct test." Under this test, the 
courts look to see if substantial fraudulent activity occurred in the United 
States, even if the security was sold abroad. As plaintiffs alleged that fraudu-
lent statements were made to them in the United States and caused them to 
make the ill-fated investments, this test would likely be satisfied. See, SEC v. 
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (jurisdiction lies if' 'some activity to 
further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country''). Compare, however, 
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who agreed to underwrite insurance risks through Lloyd's of 
London. Lloyd's is actually a market in which underwriting 
syndicates, consisting of one or more Names, compete for business. 
The syndicates are managed by Managing Agents, who deal with 
the Names through Members' Agents. To join a syndicate, a Name' 
must travel to London and sign a series of documents. The principal 
document is the General Undertaking, which includes the choice-
of-forum/forum-selection clauses at issue in the cases.30 
Upon executing a General Undertaking, a Name joins an under-
writing syndicate and provides underwriting capital. When a 
syndicate underwrites a risk, each Name is responsible only for his 
share of any loss; however, liability is unlimited for that share. 
Names within a syndicate are thus severally liable for the risks un-
dertaken. In light of this financial risk, Names must provide proof of 
financial strength, and an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of 
Lloyd's. 
The litigation arose because several of the syndicates suffered 
heavy unanticipated losses in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to 
asbestos-related litigation and catastrophic events such as Hurricane 
Hugo and the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Locker-
hie, Scotland. These losses caused intra-market disputes, with 
Names accusing Managing Agents and others connected with 
Lloyd's of fraud and mismanagement. Some Names instituted liti-
gation and withheld payments due on the liabilities, while others 
were unable to meet their obligations. With the integrity of the entire 
Lloyd's market in jeopardy, Lloyd's proposed a reorganization that 
Bersh v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
1018 (1975) (conduct must directly cause the loss). See, generally, Philip R. 
Wolf, "International Securities Fraud: Extraterritorial Subject Matter Juris-
diction," 8 N.Y. Intern'l. L. Rev. 1 (1995); David A. Fitzgerald, "Allen v. 
Lloyd's of London: A Comment on Forum Selection," 30 Conn. L. Rev. 257 
( 1997) (supporting the extraterritorial applicability of the federal securities 
laws to the Lloyd's cases). 
30Those clauses provided: 
2.1 The rights and obligations of the parties arising out of or relating to 
the Member's membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business 
at, Lloyd's and any other matter referred to in this Undertaking shall be 
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England. 
2.2 Each party hereto irrevocably agrees that the courts of England shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute and/or controversy of 
whatsoever nature arising out of or relating to the Member's member-
ship of, and/or underwriting of insurance business at Lloyd's .. 
Quoted in Richard's, 135 F.3d at 1292. 
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would limit the Names' liability, but require them to furnish ad-
ditional capital. 
This plan of reorganization was at issue in the Fourth Circuit liti-
gation, where the plaintiffs sued to enjoin Lloyd's solicitation for 
approval of the plan, alleging violations of the federal proxy rules. 31 
In the other cases, the plaintiffs alleged that Lloyd's representatives 
procured their investments fraudulently (in violation of Rule 1 O(b )-
5 and the common law) and in violation of the registration provi-
sions of the Securities Act.32 The Fourth Circuit ruled that the proxy 
rules did not apply to Lloyd's solicitation,S3 and all the courts held 
that the choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses were valid and en-
forceable. Thus, the courts dismissed all of the cases for lack of ju-
risdiction. 
On the critical choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses, the courts 
relied heavily on a 1972 U.S. Supreme Court case, MIS Bremen v. 
Zapata Off-Shore Co. 34 Bremen involved the enforceability of a 
forum-selection clause in a contract between an American barge 
owner and a German towing company. The contract included 
clauses relieving the towing company from liability for its negli-
gence and designating the High Court of Justice in London as the 
forum for the resolution of disputes. The towing company never 
completed its contract, as a severe storm damaged the barge, and the 
towing company towed the damaged barge to Tampa, Florida, the 
nearest point of refuge. The barge owner sued the German company 
in federal district court in Tampa, alleging negligence and breach of 
contact. The District Court refused the defendant's motion to 
dismiss, virtually ignoring the parties' forum-selection clause. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the forum-selection clause is 
not enforceable unless the designated forum is more convenient 
than the forum in which the suit was brought. Based on several fac-
tors, the appellate court decided that London was a less convenient 
forum than Tampa. Further, since English courts would likely honor 
the agreement's exculpatory clause, contrary to the likely result in 
U.S. courts, enforcing the forum-selection clause would violate 
American public policy. 
31 Allen v. Lloyd's ofLondon, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996). 
32Thus, the plaintiffs sought damages under Sections 12(1) and (2) of the 
Securities Act. In addition, several of the cases included claims under RICO. 
33See Allen, supra note 31. 
34M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) 
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, hold-
ing that while forum-selection clauses historically have not been 
favored by American courts, ''such clauses are prima facie valid 
and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resist-
ing party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances. " 35 The 
opinion gives guidance on what factors would render enforcement 
unreasonable: (1) if the clause was included as the result of fraud, 
undue influence, or overweening bargaining power;36 (2) if the 
complaining party ''will for all practical purposes be deprived ofhis 
day in court,'' due to the grave inconvenience or unfairness of the 
designated forum; 37 (3) if a strong public policy of the forum state 
would be violated by adherence to the forum selection. 38 The Court 
grounded its decision on the realities of international trade: ''We 
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international 
waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved 
in our courts.' ' 39 International trade is facilitated, the Court noted, if 
the parties can agree in advance on a forum for resolving disputes. 40 
The Circuit courts in the Lloyd's cases relied on Bremen because 
they characterized their cases as international in character, 41 that is, 
Bremen in a different context. Several of the courts added that 
international comity-respect for the integrity and competence of 
foreign tribunals-provides another reason why the courts should 
enforce choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses in an international 
agreement. 42 The analysis then shifted to the whether the clauses 
were unreasonable under Bremen's guidelines. In this regard, all of 
the cases focused on the third factor, public policy, because of the 
anti waiver sections of the federal securities laws. Do the anti waiver 
sections demonstrate a strong public policy that the federal securi-
ties laws should apply to this controversy notwithstanding the par-
ties' agreement to the contrary? The courts ·answered this question 
35Id. at 13. 
36Id. at 12. 
37Id. at 18. 
38Id. at 15. 
39Id. at 9. 
40Id. at 13. 
41E.g., Riley, 969 F.2d at 957 ("[w]hen an agreement is truly international, 
as here, ... ");Bonny, 3 F.3d at 159, n.3 ("[t]here is no question that the 
transaction involved here is truly international.''). 
42E.g., Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363. 
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in the negative, instead finding that the remedies under British law 
were adequate. 43 In this view, the federal securities laws reflect 
''policies of insuring full and fair disclosure by issuers and deter-
ring the exploitation of U.S. investors,"44 and British law will not 
interfere with that policy. While British law may be less advanta-
geous to investors in some respects,45 it is, the courts concluded, 
''adequate.' ' 46 
Doctrinally, the Circuit courts faced two problems. The first was 
posed by dictum in an earlier Supreme Court case, Mitsubishi Mo-
tors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth.47 In Mitsubishi, a private antitrust 
action, the Court said in a footnote that ''in the event the choice-of-
forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospec-
tive waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for 
antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning 
the agreement as against public policy.' ' 48 The Circuits had to 
determine whether this dictum controlled the Lloyd's cases. The 
second doctrinal problem was whether Bremen should be distin-
guished because the federal securities laws, unlike the law in Bre-
men, include antiwaiver sections. 
Obviously, none of the courts felt constrained by the Mitsubis hi 
dictum. While noting the Mitsubishi dictum, the courts generally 
responded that the choice-of-law/forum-selection clause was 
problematic only if English law did not provide adequate remedies 
to the plaintiffs.49 Essentially, the courts read the Mitsubishi dictum 
functionally, implicitly assuming that the Supreme Court was more 
concerned with assuring a fair remedy for the plaintiff than with as-
suring the availability of the congressionally-designated remedy. 
The Fifth Circuit noted that Mitsubishi was an antitrust case and 
43Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161. 
44Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161; Roby, 996 F.2d at 1365. 
45Roby, 996 F.2d at 1366 (U.S. law provides plaintiffs with "a greater vari-
ety of defendants and a greater chance of success due to lighter scienter and 
causation requirements .... ") 
46See supra note 43. At least one writer has criticized this assessment of ad-
equacy. See, Jennifer M. Eck, "Turning Back the Clock: A Judicial Return to 
Caveat Emptor for U.S. Investors in Foreign Markets," 19 N.C.J. Int'1 L. & 
Com. Reg. 313, 327-31 (1994). 
47Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.l9 
(1985) 
48Id. 
49E.g., Shell, 55 F.3d at 1229; Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161; Riley, 996 F.2d at 957. 
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thus distinguishable on that basis. The court reasoned that the 
special nature of the antitrust laws, assuring vindication of the 
national policy against monopoly, encourages ''the bringing of 
private claims in American courts.' ' 50 This reasoning is question-
able, however, because in the Mitsubishi case itself the Supreme 
Court enforced a forum-selection clause that designated Japanese 
arbitration of an American automobile dealer's antitrust claim. The 
issue was whether arbitration of an antitrust claim in Japan was con-
trary to the public policy reflected in the antitrust statutes. The Court 
said that it was not, because the claim was not extinguished; rather, 
''the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory 
cause of action in the arbitral forum .... " 51 In the Lloyd's cases, 
by contrast, the federal securities laws were extinguished, or waived, 
by the choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses. 
In overcoming the Mitsubishi dictum, all of the Circuits relied, 52 
to a greater or lesser extent, on a 197 4 Supreme Court decision, 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 53 This reliance seems misplaced, 
however, because in Scherk the Court simply enforced a foreign 
forum-selection clause in a securities law case where the agreement 
provided that Illinois law would apply. The case was similar to the 
arbitration cases in which the Court overruled Wilko, because the 
question was whether securities laws claims could be resolved, 
under the antiwaiver sections, in a forum other than U.S. courts. 
Presaging its decisions overruling Wilko, the Court enforced the 
foreign forum-selection clause in Scherk. In neither the arbitration 
cases nor in Scherk, however, did the Court suggest that parties 
could also contract out of the application of U.S. law. Indeed, the 
point of the Mitsubishi dictum is that they cannot. 
The Mitsubishi dictum should be particularly persuasive in the 
context of the Lloyd's cases because the Lloyd's cases involved 
statutes that expressly prohibited waiver of the statutory remedies. 
The antitrust statute, at issue in Mitsubishi, does not contain an anti-
waiver section. As the panel in the Ninth Circuit reasoned, ''a forti-
50Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 968, quoting from Kempe v. Ocean Drilling & 
Exploration Co., 876 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1989). 
51473 u.s. 614, 637. 
52E.g., Richards, 135 F.3d at 1295 
53Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
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ori" the Supreme Court would condemn the choice-of-law/forum-
selection clauses in the General Undertaking. 54 
While each of the circuit court opinions noted that the anti waiver 
sections posed an issue, each treated the question quite abruptly. 
Indeed, the courts did not recognize the antiwaiver sections as 
changing the legal issue before them. As with the Mitsubishi dictum, 
the courts characterized the issue as relating to the adequacy of En-
glish law. Under this view, the antiwaiver sections did not, them-
selves, reflect any public policy different from the underlying policy 
of the securities laws. Thus, it was sensible for the courts to consider 
whether English law was consistent with that policy. The courts 
could have characterized the anti waiver sections somewhat stronger, 
however, as reflecting a policy that parties cannot contract to replace 
the substantive protections of the securities laws with other laws. 
Failing to interpret the antiwaiver sections in this manner essentially 
eliminates any content in them. Put differently, the analysis in the 
Lloyd's cases would have been identical if the federal securities 
laws did not include antiwaiver sections. Only a panel of the Ninth 
Circuit-in a decision that the Circuit, sitting en bane, withdrew-
saw the law differently. 
In its decision, the panel reasoned that the policy-based approach 
of the other circuit courts was inappropriate in light of the anti-
waiver sections; consequently, the "reasonableness of the [clauses] 
is not determinative of their enforceability. ''55 Rather, in the panel's 
view, Congress had already determined, in adopting anti waiver sec-
tions, that the law of the United States would apply to solicitations 
in the United States of investments in securities by residents of the 
United States.56 The panel decision suggests that the arbitration 
cases do not reflect a fundamental shift in the interpretation of the 
antiwaiver sections, but a reasonable outcome in the clash between 
the federal arbitration statute and the federal securities laws. The 
54Richards v. Lloyd's ofLondon, 107 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn, 
135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998) (en bane). 
ssld. 
56Id. None of the courts dealt directly with two important underlying issues. 
The first was a question of jurisdiction: did the plaintiffs' investment in Lloyd's 
constitute the purchase of securities so that the federal securities laws were 
even implicated? The second was a choice-of-law question: assuming that the 
investments involved the purchase of a security, was there a sufficient nexus to 
the United States so that in the absence of the choice-of-law/forum-selection 
clauses U.S. law would apply? See supra note 29. 
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former favors arbitration, while latter does not. There is no similar 
clash in the Lloyd's cases: on one hand is a public policy favoring 
choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses, and on the other is a federal 
statute that does not. In this face-off, the statute must prevail over a 
policy not reflected in a statute. Similarly, Bremen does not support 
the circuit court decisions in the Lloyd's cases. It did not involve the 
application of a federal statute, much less one with an antiwaiver 
section. 
The panel's decision seems to make intuitive sense. The courts 
that ruled against the plaintiffs read into the antiwaiver sections a 
qualification that is simply not present. As the courts read the sec-
tion, a purchaser of securities can agree to waive the protections of 
the law, proVided the parties agree on an adequate substitute to those 
provisions. In other contexts, courts generally give antiwaiver 
statutes a broad reading, but notable exceptions do exist, as the next 
section demonstrates. 
Antiwaiver Provisions in other Statutes 
Antiwaiver sections are present in various consumer protection 
statutes, such as consumer credit codes, 57 consumer protection acts, 58 
and deceptive trade practices acts, 59 in franchising acts, 60 and in 
some federal statutes. 61 In general, the courts have taken a broad 
view of anti waiver sections. They have refused to enforce general 
releases of claims, for instance, unless the release was specific as to 
the claims covered, or other agreements that limit statutory protec-
tions.62 
The high water mark among these many cases may be a 1949 
57 See, e.g., Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 1.1 07(1) ("Except as 
otherwise provided in this Act, a buyer, lessee, or debtor may not waive or 
agree to forego rights or benefits under the Act.''). 
58E.g., Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.86.00, et. seq. (1989); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann. art. 5069-7.07(6) (West 1997). 
59See, e.g., Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 
Ann. § 17.42 (West 1987). 
60See, e.g., Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann 815 705/41 (1998); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 
§ 687 (McKinney 1998). 
61E.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A §§51, et. seq. (1986). 
62E.g., Wicker v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690 (3rd Cir. 1998); 
Babbitt v. Norfolk & Western Rwy. Co., 104 F.3d 89 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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U.S. Supreme Court case, Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co.,63 
interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act.64 This act 
provides a federal cause of action for railroad workers injured as a 
result of a common carrier's negligence. The act provides that venue 
is proper where the defendant resides, where the defendant is doing 
business when the cause of action arose, or where the defendant will 
be doing business at the time of commencing such action. 65 The act 
also includes an antiwaiver section that voids ''[a]ny contract ... 
the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common car-
rier to exempt itself from any liability created by this Act.' ' 66 In 
Boyd, the injured employee agreed, in exchange for payments made 
by the defendant carrier before its liability was established, to bring 
suit under the act where he lived or where he was injured. The Court 
held that the agreement was void, because it limited the plaintiff's 
choice of venue in conflict with the venue provisions of the act. The 
venue provision, the Court said, was a ''right of sufficient substanti-
ality to be included within the mandate'' of the anti waiver section. 67 
Boyd is important because it demonstrates the Court's protective 
attitude toward an antiwaiver section in several different ways. First, 
the antiwaiver section arguably only limited contracts that affected a 
common carrier's liability, while the contract in question left the 
carrier's liability unaffected. 68 Second, even if the contract were 
characterized as affecting the carrier's liability, the contract was ex-
ecuted after the liability arose, and could then fall within the settle-
ment exception to an antiwaiver section. The agreement limiting 
venue was arguably in partial settlement of the claim. The Court did 
not address this issue in the opinion. 69 Third, the agreement seemed 
to advantage the plaintiff more than it disadvantaged the defendant. 
63Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949). 
6445 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1986). 
6545 u.s.c. § 56 (1986). 
6645 u.s.c. §55 (1986). 
67338 U.S. at 265. 
68Boyd is not inconsistent, however, with the arbitration cases, because 
there the Court resolved a conflict between an antiwaiver section and a second 
federal statute that favored the enforceability of the contract's arbitration pro-
vision. In Boyd there was no such conflict to resolve. 
69In a footnote, the Court made an oblique reference to the settlement issue. 
The Court cited a court of appeals decision, on similar facts, holding that since 
the statute allowed a carrier a credit for presuit payments made, there was no 
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The Court made no mention of this issue either. In short, Boyd is a 
case that would support a result contrary to the appellate courts' de-
cisions in the Lloyd's cases. 
The enforceability of a choice-of-law clause in light of an anti-
waiver section has been an issue under state franchise statutes. These 
cases provide a situation parallel to the Lloyd's cases, but unlike the 
circuit decisions in Lloyd's, the courts in the franchising cases are 
not unanimous and provide a rare example of state court failing to 
give a broad reading to anti waiver sections. 70 The First Circuit, 
construing a Maine statute, held that the plaintiff distributor was 
protected by the statute from termination without cause, and the 
choice-of-law provision designating California law was not only 
unenforceable, but counsel's argument to the contrary was frivo-
lous.71 
By contrast, on similar facts, the Eighth Circuit, construing the 
Minnesota statute, upheld a choice-of-law clause that designated 
consideration for the agreement to limit venue. Implicitly, the Court may be 
saying that to the extent an argument may be made that the agreement was a 
partial settlement, it was unenforceable for a lack of consideration. Id. at 264. 
Under modem views of consideration, however, the agreement between the 
carrier and the injured employee did not lack consideration. The carrier was 
under no obligation to make advance payments, and its agreement to do so 
would clearly be consideration for the employee's agreement to limit the 
choice of venue. 
70Solman Distributors, Inc. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 888 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 
1989). See, also, Pan American Computer Corp. v. Data General Corp., 467 F. 
Supp. 969 (DPR 1979) (contractual choice-of-law clause invalid in light of 
statutory nonwaiver provision); Hengel, Inc. v. Hot 'N Now, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 
1311 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (in light of antiwaiver section of Illinois Franchise 
Disclosure Act, choice-of-law provision in contract was unenforceable); Flynn 
Beverage Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1174 (C.D. Ill. 
1993) (same); Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 
1990) (similar result under Indiana franchise law). Compare, Modem Com-
puter Systems, Inc. v. Modem Banking Systems, Inc., 871 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 
1989) (choice-of-law clause upheld). See also, Midwest Enterprises v. Gen-
erac Corp., 1991 WL 169059 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (contractual choice-of-law pro-
vision enforced); Banek Inc. v. Yogurt Ventures U.S.A., Inc., 6 F.3d 357 (6th 
Cir. 1993) (antiwaiver section of Michigan Franchise Investment Law did not 
preclude enforcement of contractual choice-of-law provision; the law listed 
void provisions, including forum-selection clauses, so the absence of a choice-
of-law among the void provisions suggests that such provisions are 
enforceable). 
71 Solman Distributors, Inc. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 888 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
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Nebraska law. 72 Unlike the First Circuit, which would not even 
consider enforcing the choice-of-law clause, the Eighth Circuit used 
a balancing test, weighing the parties' contacts with each state and 
the transaction, and the relative bargaining power of the parties. The 
statutory antiwaiver section was not a factor in this analysis. While 
it evidenced a policy in favor of protecting franchisees, the enforce-
ment of a choice-of-law clause-that is, recognizing freedom of 
contract-was a "powerful countervailing policy. " 73 These two 
policies neutralized one another, allowing the court to consider the 
normal factors for enforcement of a choice-of-law clause.74 Not 
surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit view is a clear minority view.75 
Statutes that Permit or Are Silent on the 
Question of Waiver 
There are, as one might expect, a large number of cases constru-
ing statutes that permit or are silent on the issue of waiver. While it 
is difficult to summarize such a large body of case law, it seems fair 
to say that courts impose exacting standards before finding a waiver 
under statutes that permit waiver,76 and are quite reluctant to recog-
nize a waiver when the statute neither permits nor prohibits waiver. 
72Modem Computer Systems, Inc. v. Modem Banking Systems, Inc., 871 
F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1989). 
73Id. at 740. 
74Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws§ 187(2) (1969). 
75See, Rev a S. Bauch, "An Update on Choice of Law in Franchise Agree-
ments: A Trend Toward Unenforceability and Limited Application," 14 
Franchise L. J. 91 (1995). 
76See, e.g., Newman v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1994) (strictly construing provisions permitting waiver); Smaldino v. 
Larsick, 630 N.E.2d 408 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (emergency exception to Home 
Solicitation Sales Act would not apply in the absence of a signed waiver); 
Mamone v. Beltone Hearing Aid Services, Inc., 611 A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. St. 
1992) (waiver that varied statutory language ineffective); Keyes v. Bollinger, 
640 P.2d 1077 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (lack of counsel at time of alleged 
waiver is a factor in considering validity of waiver). See, also, Brooks v. R.A. 
Clark's Garage Inc., 378 A.2d 1144 (N.H. 1977), involving a New Hampshire 
statute that required automobile repairers to provide a written estimate prior to 
working on a vehicle. The statute allowed a customer to waive the require-
ment. Plaintiff repair shop repaired defendant's vehicle, without providing the 
required estimate. The court held that the plaintiff could not recover for the 
repairs, even in quantum meruit, because the underlying contract was illegal. 
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The former category, statutes that permit waiver, is by far the 
smaller one. Of greater interest for present purposes is the latter 
group--statutes that are silent on the question of waiver. 
Within this group, the courts have decided many cases under the 
civil rights laws, particularly Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, and the parallel to the federal securities laws is striking. The 
courts have struggled with the appropriateness of contractual 
arbitration provisions and general releases of claims under the civil 
rights statutes, just as they have under the federal securities laws, 
despite the absence of an antiwaiver section in the civil rights 
statutes. In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a union em-
ployee, who lost a claim of discrimination in an arbitration proceed-
ing, could maintain a suit for discrimination under Title VII on the 
same facts.77 As to the employer's claim that the employee waived 
his Title VII claim by agreeing to arbitration, the Court replied that 
"an employee's rights under Title VII are not susceptible of pro-
spective waiver.' ' 78 The Court cited its 1953 decision of Wilko v. 
Swan in support. 
By 1991, however, the status of contractual arbitration provisions 
was much higher. Just as the Court had overruled Wilko and ap-
proved arbitration under the securities acts in Rodriguez and McMa-
hon, it enforced arbitration provisions under a federal civil rights 
statute. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Land Corp., 79 the Court held 
that a claimant was bound to his agreement to arbitrate his Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act claim, where the agreement 
covered statutory as well as contractual claims. The Supreme Court 
has not yet decided whether Gilmer applies to Title VII claims, but 
most lower courts that have passed on the question have ruled that it 
does.80 
Another instructive set of cases is in the antitrust area. Like the 
77 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1973). 
78Id. at 51. 
79Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Land Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
80Mouton v. Metropolitan Life Insur. Co., 147 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1998); 
Kauthar v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1998); Adams v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 67 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995); Metz v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (lOth Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 
Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992); Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield Sees., 
Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1475 (ED Cal. 1991). But see Duffield v. Robertson Ste-
phens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified 
Gardner-Denver, precluding compulsory arbitration of Title VII claim). 
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federal securities laws, the federal antitrust statutes reflect a strong 
public policy. Where the securities laws relate to the capital markets, 
the antitrust laws relate to competition in the marketplace, including 
the capital markets. Unlike the securities laws, however, Congress 
did not include an antiwaiver section in the antitrust laws. Neverthe-
less, judicial interpretation of the antitrust statutes has infused those 
laws with a judicially-created anti waiver section. 81 In Redel's Inc. v. 
General Electric Co., 82 for instance, the defendant in a Clayton Act 
action sought to defend on the basis of a general release executed by 
the plaintiff. The court disposed of the argument that the release 
could have a prospective effect: 
The prospective application of a general release to bar private 
antitrust actions arising from subsequent violations is clearly 
against public policy. A right conferred on a private party by a 
federal statute, but granted in the public interest to effectuate 
legislative policy, may not be released if the legislative policy 
would be contravened thereby.83 
Later in the opinion the court said, by way of dictum, that a gen-
eral release would not dispose of a preexisting antitrust claim if the 
releasing party was unaware of the ''factual predicate'' for the 
antitrust claim. 84 This combination-no prospective release of 
claim~ and scrutiny of releases of past claims-describes the opera-
tion of a typical antiwaiver section. The federal courts have treated 
the federal labor laws in a similar fashion. 85 In light of this substantial 
81 See, Lawlor v. National Screen Service, 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); Vir-
ginia Impression Prods. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1971) cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco Board of Trade, 
Inc., 386 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1967); Fox Midwest Theatres v. Means, 221 F.2d 
173, 180 (8th Cir. 1955); Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville 
Corp., 39 F. Supp. 117, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 136 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 
1943); Marketing Assistance Plan, Inc. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 
338 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (S.D. Tex. 1972). 
82Redel's Inc. v. General Electric Co., 498 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1974). 
83Id. at 99. 
841d. at 1 00. 
85See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (waiver of right 
to liquidated damages under Fair Labor Standards Act held invalid); NLRB v. 
Stackpole Carbon Co., 128 F.2d 188, 190 (3rd Cir. 1942) (employees could 
not assign claim for back wages ordered by NLRB); NLRB v. American 
Potash & Chemical Corp., 113 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1940) (employees could not 
waive statutory right to reinstatement); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 119 
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body of case law, one wonders what, if anything, an antiwaiver sec-
tion adds to a statute infused with a public interest. 
The Antiwaiver Sections and the 
Administration of the Securities Laws 
The Administration Problem 
Allowing contractual waiver of the regulatory aspects of the se-
curities laws would simplify the administration of those statutes. 
The "private offering" exemption of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
Securities Act) provides a nice illustration of the operative effect of 
its anti waiver section. Set forth in Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, 
the exemption provides that ''transactions by an issuer not involv-
ing any public offering'' are exempt from the Act's registration 
requirements.86 The language of this exemption seems to focus on 
the size and nature of the offering, not on the sophistication (or lack 
thereof) of the offerees. However, the courts have not interpreted the 
exemption consistent with this common sense reading. Rather, 
recognizing that the purpose of the Securities Act was to protect 
investors, the courts have read Section 4(2) so as to limit the exemp-
tion to offerings in which the offerees did not need the protections of 
the act, regardless of the number of offerees.87 Thus, a large offer-
ing, to many sophisticated investors, would be within this exemp-
tion, while an offering to one unsophisticated investor would not 
be.88 This result was necessary, however, both to protect unsophisti-
cated investors and to avoid protecting sophisticated investors who 
acknowledged that they had received adequate disclosure. If the act 
permitted waiver, the courts could have arrived at the same place 
directly, holding that sophisticated investors may waive the registra-
tion provisions, irrespective of the nature or size of the offering. 
This common sense result took years to reach, requiring amend-
F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1941) (settlement following NLRB order invalid; Board or-
der does not vindicate private rights, but the Act's public policy). 
86Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). 
87Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 
(1953). 
88Doron v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp.,545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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ments to the acf!9 and considerable mlemaking by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.90 The resulting ''private offering'' exemp-
tion today is neither as certain, nor as simple, as waiver would be. 
The uncertainty of the private offering exemption is symptomatic 
of larger problems with the federal securities laws. Those laws are 
under scrutiny, as commentators, lawmakers and market profession-
als examine the continued efficacy of the federal regulatory regime. 
In a recent thoughtful article, for instance, Professor Romano has 
argued for a ''market-oriented approach of competitive federalism 
that would expand . . . the role of states in securities regulation.' ' 91 
This view competes with others, which seek to expand the federal 
role, virtually eliminating the role of the states in securities regula-
tion. 92 Both views, and those in between, share a common goal of 
seeking to improve the efficiency of our capital markets. 93 It seems 
clear that the antiwaiver sections are an obstacle to efficiency, and 
the Lloyd's cases recognize that in an international context. 
Unfortunately, the Lloyd's cases make bad law, as they avoid the 
application of the anti waiver sections by ignoring the language of 
those sections. 
Redrafting the Antiwaiver Sections 
To achieve a measure of reality in the interpretation of the federal 
securities laws, Congress should expressly permit waiver under 
certain circumstances. This was the approach adopted by the draft-
ers of the American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities 
Code. While the Code carried forward the anti waiver concept of the 
89See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (6) (1994). 
90See, e.g., Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, et. seq. 
91 Roberto Romano, ''Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Secu-
rities Regulation," 107 Yale L. J. 2359,2361 (1998). 
92See, e.g., the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 ( 1996) (providing limited preemption of state 
securities laws), and the proposed Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act of 1998, which would eliminate state court jurisdiction over securities 
class actions involving nationally traded securities. 
93See, Steven M.H. Wallman, ''Competition, Innovation, and Regulation in 
the Securities Market," 53 Bus. Law. 341 (1998) (arguing that the SEC should 
abandon its practice of "incremental and command and control regulation" in 
favor of one ''articualting broader regulatory goals'' and allowing markets to 
satisfy them). 
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federal securities laws in Section 1725(a), it suggested an exception 
in Section 1725(b) (3) (C): 
Section 1725(a) [the antiwaiver section] does not effect . . . an 
advanced agreement . . . between any persons if a court 
determines, on consideration of their financial and legal sophisti-
cation and the relationship between them, that the purposes of 
this Code do not require the application of section 1725(a).94 
Read literally, this provision would permit waiver of any provi-
sion of the proposed Code. However, § 1725(b) included the head-
ing "Arbitration" and subsections (A) and (B) of§ 1725(b)l3) 
expressly dealt with agreements to arbitrate.95 The comments sug-
gest that the drafters were concerned with limiting Wilko v. Swan, 
which was then good precedent, and permitting arbitration, at least 
under the circumstances indicated. The formulation, as written, is a 
good one, however, and one Congress might consider. Such a 
formulation makes clear that, generally, the provisions of the law 
cannot be waived. It is also clear, however, that where the waiver 
does not interfere with the purposes of the law, the waiver is en-
forceable. 
A more comprehensive provision permitting waiver is included 
in the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 
Act. It provides, among other things, that the waiver must be in 
writing, that the consumer not be in a significantly disparate bargain-
ing position, and that the consumer be represented by counsel. 96 
Any formulation along these lines would provide the necessary as-
94ALI Federal Securities Code,§ 1725(b)(3)(C) (1980). 
95These subsections permit ''an advance agreement-
(A) by a member of or participant in a self-regulatory organization to 
arbitrate any dispute; 
(B) by any person to arbitrate a dispute arising under a rule of a self-
regulatory organization . . . unless a violation of the rule is (i) a viola-
tion ofthis Code, or (ii) actionable under section 1721(a). 
96Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann.§ 17.42 (West 1987) provides: 
(a) Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this subchapter is 
contrary to public policy and is unenforceable and void; provided, 
however, that a waiver is valid and enforceable if: 
(1) the waiver is in writing and is signed by the consumer; 
(2) the consumer is not in a significantly disparate bargaining position; 
and 
(3) the consumer is represented by legal counsel in seeking or acquiring 
the goods or services. 
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surance that a waiver would not be inconsistent with the purposes of 
the act. 
One obvious objection to a section permitting waiver is that it 
would generate unnecessary litigation as parties who have executed 
waivers seek to void the waivers. The absence of an antiwaiver sec-
tion, however, has contributed to a good deal of litigation, as so-
phisticated investors have sought to invoke the protections of the 
Securities Act by avoiding the choice-of-law/forum-selection 
clauses they have signed. Moreover, the antiwaiver sections have 
added to the cost of raising capital with a doubtful corresponding 
benefit. As thought is given in Congress to the efficiency of the 
federal securities laws, attention should be given to the antiwaiver 
sections. Although not a central element in the securities laws, the 
antiwaiver sections are material, and worthy of further consider-
ation. 
Conclusion 
One might argue that, even if an anti waiver section adds little, its 
presence is not harmful, and an antiwaiver section emphasizes the 
importance that the legislature attaches to the protective provisions 
it has enacted, not a bad thing. As noted above, however, antiwaiver 
sections are paternalistic and undiscriminating, protecting the so-
phisticated and unsophisticated alike. A proper interpretation of the 
antiwaiver section in the federal securities laws would have invali-
(b) A waiver under Subsection (a) is not effective if the consumer's legal 
counsel was directly or indirectly identified, suggested, or selected by a 
defendant or an agent of the defendant. 
(c) A waiver under this section must be: 
(1) conspicuous and in bold-face type of at least 10 points in size; 
(2) identified by the heading "Waiver of Consumer Rights," or words 
of similar meaning; and 
(3) in substantially the following form: 
''I waive my rights under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act-Consumer 
Protection Act, Section 17.41 et. seq., Business & Commerce Code, a 
law that gives consumers special rights and protections. After consult-
ing with an attorney of my own selection, I voluntarily consent to this 
waiver." 
(d) The waiver required by Subsection (c) may be modified to waive 
only specified rights under this subchapter. 
(e) The fact that a consumer has signed a waiver under this section is not 
a defense to an action brought by the attorney general under Section 
17.47. 
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dated the choice-of-law provisions in the General Undertaking. The 
investors in Lloyd's likely understood the risks they were assuming. 
They clearly understood that the promoters with whom they dealt 
insisted on the applicability of English law; indeed, the investors 
traveled to London and signed an agreement to that effect. Such a 
waiver, by such investors, in such a transaction, should be enforced, 
and U.S. law should so provide. Unfortunately, it does not. Permit-
ting waiver would solve the Lloyd's of London problem. The issue 
in the Lloyd's cases would then be cast as whether the demands of 
international trade (for certainty in the choice of law and forum) and 
international comity outweigh the public policy that underpins the 
federal securities laws. Instead, properly cast, the issue in the 
Lloyd's cases was whether the courts should carve out an exception 
to the congressionally-mandated antiwaiver sections. To reach a 
more ''just'' result, the courts did so act. 
Permitting waiver would add a sense of reality to the federal se-
curities laws. As noted above, the private offering exemption has 
been a quagmire for lawyers and their clients, in part because of the 
presence of the anti waiver sections~ If there were no such section, 
sophisticated investors and businesses seeking capital, not Congress 
or the SEC, could determine what disclosures, if any, were neces-
sary. What is argued here is that the regulatory aspects of the securi-
ties laws, specifying what documents must be delivered to inves-
tors, and when, should be interpreted with some flexibility, a 
flexibility that is precluded by the antiwaiver sections. On the other 
hand, the antifraud provisions, which are the heart of the laws, 
should continue to be unwaivable. This result would obtain even in 
the absence of an anti waiver section. 
